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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UJIFUSA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs -
NATIONAL HOUSEWARES, INC., 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained hy him as a result of 
an accident while riding on a snowmobile operated by 
defendant's employee David Bigler. 
DISPOSl TION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defondant in 
tJip amount of $10,000.00 general damages and $194.63 
:-;1wcial damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant sPPks a reYPrsal of the judgment below. 
ST1ATE1\IENT OF FAC'l'S 
The facts out of which this case arisPs an· n·lativ,.1 .. 
simple and substantially without dispuk 
Plaintiff is a commercial photographer. (H. 12S, 1:.'.!J 1 
Shortly before December 20, 19GG, lw was contart<>d hy 
one Rex Woodruff, an advertising man, to take movi<'s 
of people in a snowmobile at Alta, for use in adHrtising 
or promotional material. (R. 130) On the afternoon of 
December 20, ·woodruff picked plaintiff up at his place 
of business, and they then pickPd up David Bigl<'r, YiC'(' 
president of defendant National HousewarPs, at ib 
office on Vine Stret>t, and then proc<>Pded to Alta in 
vVoodruff's car. (R. 131) Bigler had a snowmobile on 
a trailer, which he removed. (R. 131) Plaintiff had 
never previously been on a snowmobil<'. (R. 131) 
Plaintiff rode on the snowmobile with Bigler np 
the mountain in search of an appropriate place to tah 
pictures. Bigler was in front and drove. Plaintiff sat 
behind him, straddling the seat. They followed a trail 
up the mountain. After locating a snitahle place to 
take pictures, they started down the hill following th<' 
same trail. Near the bottom, they had an accident. There 
was a hump or bump in the road. As the 
passed oyer it, the machine left the gronnd, and wlwn 
it came down, plaintiff sustained injury, although the 
machine did not turn over or upset. (R. 1:t2-1:34, l:J(i) 
vVith the assistance of otht>r nH·mh(•rs of the part:<, 
plaintiff went ov<'r to the ear and rested for tw<·nty to 
thirty minntus. He tlwn went liaC'k up tlie 11ill on the 
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:-:110\1111ol1il<>, took sonw photographs, came down the l1ill 
nn th( :-:nowmohile, took some more photographs, and 
tltl'll cam<· home. (R. 134) 
Prior to this time, plaintiff had a skier and 
ltad dmw a lot of skiing. Ile had skied at Alta and was 
familiar with the terrain. He knew that the roads up 
the mountain were not paved. He knew that they would 
he taking a trail, or unimproved road, ·which would have 
irregularities in it and would not be smooth. (R. 150, 151) 
Plaintiff had no opinion as to the speed of the snow-
mobile. (R. 156) He did not feel that the speed was 
rxc<..'ssive and made no complaint to Bigler about the 
manner of operation. (R. 157) As above noted, the snow-
mobile remained upright after the accident. (R. 156) 
Rex Woodruff observed the snowmobile coming 
down the trail, and its speed appeared to him to be 
normal. He• estimakd that the snowmobile traveled 
about ten to twelYe frl't in thc> air. (R. 159) 
RiglPr h·stifit•d that he ,,·as familiar \\·ith the trail 
and had lwen oHr it lwfon·. (R. 1G7) The hump or 
bmnp on which the aceident occurred was created by 
hlockagP of the road so automobiles would not go on 
the sPrvice road. It was newly created since the last 
time that he had passed over the trail. He had noticed 
it on the trip np th<· mountain and had driven aronnd 
tlH· edgP of it. (R. 1G7) On the return trip, the machine 
was travPling about fif'tp0n to miles per hour. 
Jfp intend<•d to drin• <JY<>r tlw lrnmp <·orninµ; do\\·n. How-
<·nr, h<· did not intc•rnl to jmup tli<> machine. (R. lf)S) 
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He explained that with this machinP, the 01wrnt'lr 
cannot go over a bump going uphill because this \Y<rn lrl 
raise so much of the tread off th(_' surfacu that th<' 111a-
chine would lose traction and "spin out.'' HO\n•n·r, c0111-
ing downhill, it is normal operation to go over bm111Js 
which are less than two fed in height. (R. 182) 
The same route was followed on tlw second trip np 
the mountain. However, in light of the previous exper-
ience, Bigler operated the machine at only fin miles per 
hour on the return trip and did not lean the ground 
when he passed over the same bump. (R. 168, 169) 
Later, efforts were made to take pictures jumping 
the machine over the bump. For this purpose, thP ma-
chine was operated at its maximum speed of approxi-
mately 35 miles per hour. In order to get satisfactory 
jump pictures, it was necessary to build up the hump 
and enlarge it. Even then, the machine would jump only 
about twelve feet, and this without a passenger. (R. 172, 
173) 
On the evening of the accident, the plaintiff saw 
Dr. Robert Lamb. (R. 122) He saw Dr. Lamb again 
the next day and, although Dr. Lamb recommended hos-
pitalization, plaintiff elected to wear a back brace and 
remain at work. Dr. Lamb saw him for purposes of 
treatment on only two other occasions, January 4 and 
February 4, 1967. (R. 123) X-rays dl•picted "minimal 
degenerative changes" which Dr. Lamb charaderized as 
of the "lowest scale of severity." 'l'lwre was no cord or 
nerve damage. (R. 124) Degenerative ehangps go on 
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m •T<'ryone as part of tJie aging lffllCC'SS. Ile anticipated 
that 'lw Jilaintiff would be able to adjust to this diffi-
rnlty and to lirn a normal lifr. (R. 12G) 
Plaintiff did not lose any days from work, although 
for a period of about ten days aftPr the accident, he 
had to lie down occasionally, and ha<l to give up some 
outside work. (R. 142, 143) No evidence was offered as 
to what loss of profit, if any, he sustained as a result 
of this. Thereafter, for a period of approximately nine 
wePks, he hired an extra employee to assist with the 
work of moving heavy equipment in doing outside work. 
(R. 143) The total cost of this was $540.00. (Ex. 14) 
This was the only evidence establishing with any degree 
of certainty, any loss of income as a result of the acci-
dent. 
After both parties had rested, defendant made a 
motion for directPd verdict, "·hich was denied. (R. 175) 
The case \vas submitted to the jury on the issues of 
nPgligenc(' on the part of defendant, contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff, and damages. De-
frndant submitted requests for instructions, both on the 
issues of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 
(R. 32, 33) In a colloquy between the conrt and counsel 
for the defendant, the court indicated that he had some 
question as to whether the issue of contributory negli-
gence should be submitted to the jury. Counsel for the 
defondant indicated that lw also had a doubt on that 
point, lrnt thought that the issue of assumption of risk 
><honld definifrly he snhmitkd to thP jury. (R. 178) Ho\\--
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ever, for reasons not indicated in the r<>cord, the f·o11J"t 
elected to submit to the jury the issue of contrihntory 
negligence rather than assumption of risk. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND REFUS-
ING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A PEREMP-
TORY INSTRUCTION. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF ASSUMPTION OF 
RISK ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
The bases of defendant's contention that tlw court 
should have directed a verdict in its favor are that tlwre 
was no evidence of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant which caused or contributed to cause the acci-
dent, and that as a matter of law, plaintiff assumed 
the risk. Since the doctrine of assumption of risk is also 
the essence of our Point II, and since, as we shall point 
out, there is a certain inter-relationship between the 
claims of no negligence on the part of dc>fendant and 
assumption of risk on the part of plaintiff, we discuss 
the two points together. 
About the only evidence plaintiff has upon which 
to rely, to establish negligence upon the part of the de-
fendant is the fact that an accident occurred. It is axio-
matic, however, that the mere occurrence of an accident 
is not in and of itself any evidence of negligence. There 
is no evidence from which the jury could find that Bigler 
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the snowmobile at an excessive or dangerous 
ratP of speed. Plaintiff himself testified that he felt 
that the speed was reasonable, that he had no concern 
about it, and made no protest concerning it. Rex \Vood-
rnff abo testifit>d that the speed on the descent appeared 
to him to be normal. No expert evidence was offered 
tending to establish that the normal safe speed was any-
thing different from the speed at which Bigler operated 
the machine. 
On the issue of proper lookout, the evidence shows 
without dispute that Bigler saw the bump or hump and 
was aware of it, both going up and coming down the 
hill. He cannot, therefore, be said to be guilty of negli-
gence in that regard. 
He elected to proceed over the bump, believing that 
he could do so without jumping the machine. His judg-
ment proved to be mistaken, but a mere mistake in judg-
ment is not rn•gligence. 
He did not lose control of the machine, but held it 
m an upright position until it came to rest. 
There is no evidence that Bigler was skylarking, 
showing off, attempting to give the plaintiff a thrill, 
or doing anything other than procPeding in a business-
like manner to move up and down the mountain to accom-
plish th0 ohjective in whieh all members of the party 
\\'ere interested. 
Although tlwr<> has h0en consickrable recent literature 
eoneerning tlw hazards of snowmohilP 01wration in gen-
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eral and the risks inherent in it, our research has dis-
covered no reported case involving injuries to passengt>rs 
on snowmobiles. The case, t11erefore, must lw dPcidPd 
on basic principles of negligence law. ·we submit tltat 
there is a complete lack of evidence upon which to 
a finding that Bigler departed from the ::;tanclard of 
reasonable care in his operation of the snowmobile. 
Turning to the doctrine of assumption of risk, we 
note that this term has been nsed by the courts in vary-
ing ways and to mean var)ing things. Primarily, 
however, it means that because the plaintiff has consPntf'd 
to the risk, the defendant has no duty toward him. See 
2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Section 21.1, 
page 1162: 
"* * * In its primary sPnse the plaintiff'::; assump-
tion of a risk is only the counterpart of the de-
fendant's lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from 
that risk. In such a case plaintiff may not recDnr 
for his injury even though he was quite rPason-
able in encountering the risk that caused it. Vo-
lenti non fit injuria. (2) A plaintiff may also be 
said to assume a risk created by dPf Pndant's 
breach of duty towards him, when he deliberately 
chooses to encounter that risk. " 
and op.cit., page 1163: 
"The term assumption of risk in its primary 
sense refers to risks that are incidental to a rela-
tionship of free association betwe('n plaintiff and 
defendant, that is to say, one which either is at 
liberty to take or leave as he will. In such a case 
defendant's duty toward plaintiff is limited. It 
does not extend to the use of care to make the 
9 
conditions of the rPlationship reasonably saf P -
at most the duty is one of eare to mak<• tlwse 
('()nditions as safe as they appPar to he and it may 
fall short of that. If tl1esP risks arP fully eompre-
lH'nded, or obvious, or of the kind which 
plaintiff and not defendant must look out for, 
then plaintiff will be held to have assumed them 
by voluntarily entering into the rPlationship which 
entails them .... " 
It has been said by this court in several cases that 
knowledge or comprehension of the risk by the plaintiff 
is the watchword of assumption of risk. However, as 
pointed out in Harper and James, this is not always 
true. See 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Sec-
tion 21.2, page 1168: 
"It is sometimes said that knowledge or com-
prehPnsion of the risk by plaintiff is the watch-
word of assumption of risk. In many types of 
situations this is true; in others it is not. Unless 
the limitations which should be put on such a 
statement are fully apprt>ciated, it may be very 
misleading. There may be assumption of a spe-
cific risk of which the plaintiff is completely ig-
norant .... " 
and also, page 1170: 
" ... It seems safe to say, however, that 
there are at least somf' situations whose dangers 
are so obvious, so customary, and so commonly 
known that a defendant nePd give no warning of 
them. Hert> again a plaintiff may assume a risk 
that lw does not in fact comprehend .... " 
'l'he same authors furtlwr observt> that voluntary partici-
pants in lawful gamt>s and spo1is assume the risk of 
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injnry at the hands of their frllm,- participanb. Se(• page 
1181. 
Similar language is ns<'d hy Pross<'r: 
" ... In its simplest and s<>ns<·, it mean,; 
that thl' plaintiff has giwn his ex1n·<·ss cons<·nt 
to relie\-p the defendant of an obligation of' con-
duct toward him, and to take his rlmnr<' of injm? 
from a lrno\\11 risk. The rPsult is that the U<'-
f endant is simply nnd<'r no legal duty to proteet 
the plaintiff. A second, and closely related m<'an-
ing, is that the plaintiff, with knowledge of the 
risk, has entered voluntarily into sonw r<'lation 
with th<' defendant which im-olves it, 
and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agT<'P-
ing to take his own chances. . . . " Prosser on 
Torts, Second Edition, Section 55, page 303. 
And, at page 307 the same author says: 
" ... By enteri11g frrrl11 and volwntari.!11 into mn1 
relatio·n or sit11atio11 u'71ich presr11ts olnious do11-
ger, the plaintiff may be taken to arcqJt it, and 
to agree that he will look out for himself, arnl 
relieve the defondant of Those 
who participate or sit as s1wetators at sports 
and amusement::; assurn<> all the obvious risks of 
being hurt hy roller coastPrs, halls, fir(•-
works Pxplosions, or the strnggl<'s of tlw eontl>st-
ants. 'The timorous may sta11 at home.' ... Tlie 
co11se11t is found in qoi11q ahead irith full J,;1101rl-
edgc of the risk." (Emphasis ours.) 
See further, page 310: 
"At the time, it is eYident that in all sneh 
cases an ohj<•ctive standard mnst be appliPd, and 
that th<• plaintiff ca1111ot lie heard to ::;ay tliot lie 
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dirl 1wt comprehend a risk which must lw1;e l;cen 
oln;ions to him. As in thP eas<' of neglig-<>m·P ibself, 
there are cerfai,11 risks u'71ich am1011e of arlu1t aqe 
must 7Jc takc11 to a1JJJrcci11te: .. . "(Emphasis ours) 
\'<'!':-' similar lang11ag0 is found in the Re ... ;tat,,nu'nt of 
the Laze of Torts Scco11d, in comrnent ''c" under Section 
49GA. 
\Yhile this conrt has lwl'n rctict>nt to apply the doc-
tri1w of assumption of risk to automohil0 tn)e cases, it 
has iw·ogniz0d its place in cases involving sports, either 
a:-; a participant or s1wctator, 'dtt>re the hazard is of a 
tn>e '"hieh should he perceiwd by a person of ordinary 
expPrience and prudt>ncc•. 
In Harnilton vs. Salt Lake City Corporation, 120 
G-±7, 237 P.2d 841, the plaintiff was held to have 
assnnwd the risk of being struck by a foul ball while 
attending a baseball game. 
In Tannehill rs. Terry, 11 Utah 2d 368, 359 P.2d 
911, this court held that it was not error to submit the 
issnP of assumption of risk to tht> jury in a case where 
the plaintiff was struck in the face by a golf club by the 
<lf·fendant. In that ease, the plaintiff had no more knowl 
rdge of the game of golf than did the plaintiff here of 
snowmobiling. 
In Harrop vs. Beckman, 15 Utah 2d 78, 387 P.2d 
554, this court recognized that the doctrine would be 
applicable to the risks incident to water skiing. The doc-
trint> was not applied in that cast>, sincP it did not apply 
to th<' 1wgligPnee of the ch•fondant, the operator of another 
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boat who collided with the plaintiff after the plaintif'r 
lost her water skis and was dislodged from the hoat 
which was towing her. 
The most recent expression from this court on this 
subject is found in Foster vs. Steed, 459 P.2d 1021, where 
it said: 
"Where the trial court has rd'mw<l to snhmit 
the issues to the jury, and has ruled on tlwm as 
a matter of law, his action can pro1wrly be sus-
tained only if the evidence compels findings in 
accordance with his ruling .... Accordingly, if 
under any reasonable view of the evidence, and 
the inferences that fairly may be derii:cd there-
from, the jury coidd remain m1co11vi11ced on such 
issues, the directed verdict was wrong and the 
issues should have been submitted to the jury.'' 
(Emphasis ours.) 
It was accordingly held that the issnPs of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk should ha\'<' been suh-
mitted to the jury, and not determined hy the court as 
a matter of law. We submit that if 11laintiff was not 
guilty of assumption of risk as a matter of law, there 
was at the very least substantial evidence upon \\·hich 
a jury could have found as a matter of fact that he 
was guilty of assumption of risk. He had skied at Alta 
and was familiar with its terrain. He was aware that 
the trail over which he would travel was not a smooth 
one, and that it would have irrPgulariti<>s in it. '!'hr 
nature of the machine was open and apparent. (8Pr ex-
hibits 15, lG, 17, and 18.) Plaintiff was aware that the 
machine would necessarily pass over depressions, hm11ps, 
-
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UJIFUSA vs. NATIONAL HOUSEWARES, INC. 
CORRECTION TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
The following case was decided by this court 
after Appellant's Brief was printed and filed, and 
is cited in support of Points I and II of Appel-
lant's Brief. It should follow immediately after 
the quotation from Foster vs. Steed at the middle 
cl page 12: 
Calahan vs. Wood, Ut.2d , 465 P.2d 169. 
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rises, and irret,'1Jlarities in its vath, and as a reasonable 
1wn;on must havP known that wlwn it did so, it would 
qnitP probably leave th<· ground and travPl for some 
distance through the air. He mnst have been equally 
mindful that when it returned to tlw ground, th<>re would 
lw some impact to the ridc•r, and, of cotirsP, any n·rtical 
itupad to tlw spine earriPs some risk of injury. These 
risks th<> plaintiff must be deemed to have known, under-
stood and voluntarily assmned. 
POINT III 
THE DAl\IAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WERE 
EXCESSIVE. 
As has been pointed out in our statement of facts, 
the injury sustained by the plaintiff did not require him 
to ht> hospitalized and, in fact, it was necessary for him 
to see his doctor only on four occasions, the last of which 
was approximately six weeks after the injury occurred. 
l t was not necessary for him to take any time away from 
his work. He demonstrated no loss of income as a result 
of his injury, except the cost of hiring an assistant for 
a couple of months during the time that plaintiff was 
unable to do heavy lifting. His expense for medical 
care was minimal, and his doctor characterized his in-
jury as "minimal" and of the "lowest scale of severity." 
In the face of this evidence, the jury awarded the 
plaintiff $10,000.00 general damages, in addition to his 
k]wcial darnag<>s. Defendant contends that this award for 
p:<·1wral dmnages is and either should have 
lH·<>n r<>duced, or a new trial granted. 
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"\Ve rPcognize that dc•cisions in other cases arr of 
limited vallte in appraising the ad<•q\rney .i, ... _ 
ness of a jury award. As said by this court in Duf f.71 1. 1. 
Union Pacific Railroad Compa11y, l 18 Ptah S:2, :218 P.:2d 
1080: 
deeidPd cas<'s an· of littl<> value in 
fixing present day standards or in assisting courts 
in determining excrssive awards. Both the comt 
and jury are rPquin•d to dt>al 1\-ith many unkno\rn 
factors and a good guess is about tlH· lwst that 
can be hoped for. The permissihl<' minimum and 
maximmn limits within which a jury may oprratc 
for a given injury are pn·s<>ntly far apart and 
must continue to be widespread so long as pain 
and suffering must be measured by money stand-
ards .... " 
However, we believe that the cases hereinafter cited 
are sufficiently similar on their facts and sufficiently 
analogous to the case at bar to he of some vahw to the 
court in passing upon our contention hen·. In tlie case 
of Shrpard vs. Payne, 60 Utah 140, 20G P. 1098, this 
court held a $10,000.00 VPrdict exc(•ssive and ordered a 
reduction to $7,500.00. This court there said: 
"'Vhile W<' do not rPgarcl the VC'rdict as th<· n•sult 
of passion and prejudi<'e, \H' an• com·inc<'d that it 
is excessive, and therPfor<• nnjust to the def<·1Hl-
ant. GrPat latitnc1<' is n<'c<'ssaril)· allmn•d to a 
jury in asspssing damag<·s for JH'rsonal injuries. 
A plaintiff who is entit!Pd to damages should lie 
full)- compemmted. No v<>rdict is right which fails 
to cornpensat<>; non<• is right whi<'h rnon• tlian c·on1-
pensates. The trial judg<• sl1onld not in tliis ea,;1• 
have granted a n<'w trial, but, in the exercis<' of 
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his discrPtion, lw should haw n•quin·d illaintiff to 
n·mit part of t!1P jndgment, and, in tlw ('VPnt of 
rdu:-:al, :-:houlcl Jun·<' grant<•d tlw motion for a new 
trial. ... " 
In the ahow-<1uot<•d case of Duffy rs. Union Pacific 
Ha ii road C 0111JHI11.11, an FELA ca:-:(•, the jury rdurnl'd a 
verdiet of $12,GOO.OO for lH'rsomtl injnries, reclncl'd hy 
tlw arnonnt of $:3,500.00 for plaintiff's contributory negli-
gPneP, making a nd venlict of $9,000.00 In that case, 
tlw plaintiff had to undl'rgo surgery and was hospitalized 
for a lWriod of thirteen days. He lost approximately 
$1,300.00 in lost 'rngl's, leaving a gross award for general 
,]amag(_•s of $11,200.00 In holding that amount excessive 
and in ordering a rl'mittitur of $4,000.00, this court said: 
"\Ye must assunw that th<' jury awarded plain-
tiff the snm of $1,::JOO for loss of wages, which 
W<'l'<' his only Pstahlished s1wcial damages, and 
this )paws the sum of $11,200 for general dam-
ag<•s. \\Then \\·e gl't in this domain reasonable 
minds might differ as to what amotmt is excessive. 
Hmvpver, there must h(_' a limit which a 
reasonable jnry cannot go and the limit must be 
dPtl>rmi1wd on th<' gross amonnt of the verdict 
and not the nPt amount. Conceding that jurors 
in diffen•nt states and counties han different 
stanclarch; and different ideas as to the 
n1ltw of pain and snffrring; that prt>sPnt da:v costs 
of living an· comparatiwly high; that the pur-
cliasing powN of tlw dollar has decrPased to ap-
proxirnatPi>· orn•-half of \\·hat it 'vas sonw ten years 
ago; that \Ve art> in an inflationary 
spiral; and, that hy all reasonah!P standards ver-
dids should be larg'('l" than tlH•y \\'l'l'l' at that 
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period; \VE' arc, rn'v0rtlwl«ss, of the op1mon n1 
this case that the damages mYanlPd hy th" .illl, 
have no foundation in fact, and arP so 
excessive and exorbitant as to convince tlw men;_ 
bers of this Court that the verdict is far in exC'P,;.; 
of what a reasonable jury could det('rrninP as tlw 
maximmn amount awardahle for this type of in-
jury. For these reasons it ap1wars to us to 
have been given under the influence of passion 
and prejudice.'' 
In Stamp vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 5 
Utah 2d 397, 303 P.2d 279, plaintiff sustained an injury 
to his eye, which required him to be in the hospital for 
four days and to lose eleven days from work. The jury 
awarded $12,500.00 damages and deducted $2,500.00 on 
account of plaintiff's contributory negligence, leaving 
a net verdict of $10,000.00. In holding this award exces-
sive and ordering a remittitur of $4,000.00, this court 
said: 
"In our opm10n it cannot be justly denied that 
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in Duffy v. 
Union Pacific R. Co. were of much longer dura-
tion and well calculated to result in morP 1wrma-
nent disability. Duffy, like Stamp, suffered ex-
treme pain; he was off work three and one-half 
months compared to the 1 :3 days that plaintiff 
in this case was off. 
"\Ve are of the opinion that tlw a\\·ard ma(k• hy 
the jury has no basis in fact. Such an mnrnl is 
so Pxcessive as to he shorking to onP's cons<'i('n<'(' 
and to indir·ate passion or prejndie(', and 
it abundantly app<'ars that therP is no evide11cP 
to support or justify the wrdict. rl'he trial court 
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abused its discretion in rPfusing to grant a new 
trial or in ordering a rPmittitur.'' 
Similar reasoning was followed in the case of Ruf 
rs. Association for World Trai·el Exchange, 10 Utah 2d 
249, 351 P.2d 623. We also invite attention to the case of 
Loddcr vs. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 123 Utah 
31G, 259 P.2d 589. In the opinion in that case, there are 
eollt>ctrd decisions from this court wherein remittiturs 
ranging from 25 per cent up to 50 per cent have been 
ordrred or approved. Under the criteria heretofore 
established by this court, the award of general damages 
in this case is excessive and a remittitur should be 
ordered or a new trial granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to prove any negligence on the part 
of the defendant and the evidence shows that plaintiff 
assmned the risk as a matter of law, and the verdict and 
judgment should be set aside with directions to enter 
jndgmmt in favor of the defendant, no cause of action. 
Alternatively, the judgment should be reversed and re-
manded for a new trial with directions to submit the 
issue of assumption of risk to the jury. The verdict is 
excessive and if the judgment on liability is permitted to 
stand, a remittitur should be orderrd. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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